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Abstract
We present a microeconomic analysis of subsistence consumption in a standard
consumer theory setting. We define subsistence and saturation induced irrele-
vance (SSI) preferences for an individual who makes choices over two goods: a
basic good and a non-basic good. The basic good has two key features: subsis-
tence and saturation. We axiomatize SSI preferences using two key concepts: (i)
‘irrelevance’ of a good in a consumption bundle (increasing its amount does not
make the consumer better off) and (ii) an ‘unhappy set’ (any bundle outside such
a set is preferred to all bundles inside). SSI preferences more adequately repre-
sent the decision problem of the poor and give certain new insights on consumer
behavior that are not captured by widely used utility functions such as Stone-
Geary. We also axiomatize a generalized version of Leontief (GL) preferences,
for which irrelevance is solely driven by complementarity.
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“Of the nonpossession of the matter of subsistence in such quantity as is nec-
essary to the support of life, death is the consequence: and such natural death
is preceded by a course of suffering much greater than what is attendant on the
most aﬄictive violent deaths employed for the purpose of punishment.”
—Jeremy Bentham, Pannomial Fragments (1843).
1 Introduction
Subsistence is the minimum amount of basic necessities essential for a person’s sur-
vival. It can be expressed alternatively in terms of income (e.g., $1.25 per day) or in
terms of nutrition such as a certain daily calorie requirement. As extreme poverty and
hunger continue to pose a major global challenge, subsistence remains a useful concept
for policymakers. Poverty lines are based on estimates of the cost of a consumption
basket considered minimal for the survival of a family (World Bank, 2013). Effective
policies to end hunger require knowledge of food deficit, which is measured by compar-
ing the average dietary energy of undernourished people with the minimum amount of
dietary energy needed to maintain body weight and carry out light activity (Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2014).
Jeremy Bentham (1843), one of the founding fathers of utility theory, considered
“securing the existence of, and sufficiency of, the matter of subsistence for all the mem-
bers of the community” an important milestone towards achieving “the all embracing
end—the greatest happiness of the greatest number of the individuals belonging to the
community in question.” Yet the treatment of subsistence consumption is far from ad-
equate in a standard utility maximization setting. This was pointed out long back by
Stigler (1950),1 but the lacuna still remains. Stone-Geary utility functions are widely
used to model subsistence.2 Under these functions it is implicitly assumed that utility
is negative below the subsistence level, so when an individual cannot purchase the good
above that level, there is no choice problem of interest. This essentially sidesteps the
problem of the poor, because for a poor person the decision problem precisely occurs
in the region below the subsistence, where the individual makes choices to get as close
to the subsistence as possible. The Stone-Geary approach is also inadequate to under-
stand the problems of individuals who have only marginally exceeded the subsistence
threshold, as a rise in the prices of basic goods such as food can take such individuals
below the subsistence.
Seeking to address these inadequacies, this paper presents a microeconomic analysis
of subsistence consumption in a standard consumer theory framework. We axiomatize
subsistence consumption in a utility maximization setting where an individual makes
1To quote: “Occasionally it was stated that the marginal utility of a necessity falls rapidly as
its quantity increases and the like; and there were some mystical references to the infinite utility of
subsistence. These were ad hoc remarks, however, and were not explicitly developed parts of the
formal theory.”
2See, e.g., Rebelo (1992) and Steger (2000), who use Stone-Geary functions to study the role of
subsistence in economic growth. Sharif (1986) provides a survey of measurement issues of subsistence.
Subsistence consumption has also been associated with Giffen behavior, i.e., upward sloping demand
curve (Jensen and Miller, 2008).
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choices over two goods: a basic good which is a necessity such as food3 and a non-
basic good.4 In developing our theory we appeal to two distinct aspects of a basic
necessity. First, the individual requires a minimum critical level of this good. This
is the subsistence requirement. If this requirement is not met, the non-basic good
is not useful. The second aspect is saturation, which is in line with the concept of
‘abundance’ proposed by Bentham (1843). Saturation implies that once the individual
has consumed sufficiently large amounts of the basic good, consuming more of it may
not be beneficial.
Subsistence and saturation generate irrelevance of one of the goods. A good is irrel-
evant at a consumption bundle if increasing its amount without changing the amount
of the other good keeps the consumer indifferent. The non-basic good is irrelevant in
the subsistence zone (i.e., when the subsistence requirement is not met), while the basic
good becomes irrelevant when its saturation is reached. Incorporating these features,
we define subsistence and saturation induced irrelevance (SSI) preferences. For such
preferences there are potentially three zones in the commodity space. Apart from the
two zones where one of the goods is irrelevant, there can be an intermediate region
(where the consumption of the basic good has exceeded the subsistence level but not
yet reached saturation) in which none of the goods is irrelevant. In this region the
individual has a standard consumer preference where two goods can be imperfect sub-
stitutes. SSI preferences thus enrich consumer theory by allowing for the existence of
poverty and prosperity in different regions of the commodity space. This formalizes
Bentham’s concepts of subsistence and abundance in terms of individual preference.
Theorem 1 axiomatizes SSI preferences.
SSI preferences are nonhomothetic. Their nonhomotheticity is driven by the irrel-
evance of the non-basic good in the subsistence zone. Since this is a key aspect of the
consumption choice problem of the poor, SSI preferences can help us to have a better
understanding of some empirically observed consumption patterns of the poor. For
example, the global consumption database of the World Bank (2010), which looks at
sector-wise shares of consumption for different income groups in developing countries,
indicates the presence of nonhomotheticities.5 Stone-Geary utility functions are also
nonhomothetic, but SSI preferences give certain new insights on consumer behavior
that are not captured by Stone-Geary functions. Under SSI preferences, an increase in
the price of the basic good may take a consumer from non-subsistence to subsistence
zone. Whether a specific instance of poverty is temporary (driven by fluctuations in
food prices) or chronic (due to low levels of income) can thus be better understood in
terms of SSI preferences. SSI preferences may also give rise to what we call ‘subsistence
inertia’ where it is optimal for a consumer to buy only the basic good even though he
is outside the subsistence zone, implying that the absence of the non-basic good in a
3The Sanskrit word for bare subsistence gra¯sa¯ccha¯dana makes the components of subsistence par-
ticularly clear. It is a compound consisting of two words: gra¯sa (food) and a¯ccha¯dana (clothing).
4Jensen and Miller (2010) also consider a two-good setting to study subsistence behavior. However,
both goods in their model are basic goods (food items that contribute calories) and there is substi-
tutability between them. Substitutability across different basic goods as an optimization problem was
first analyzed by Stigler (1945).
5World Bank (2010) http://datatopics.worldbank.org/consumption/home
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consumption basket does not reveal that a consumer is in his subsistence zone.6
The concept of irrelevance that is used to define SSI preferences also applies when
the two goods are complements, as in Leontief preferences. If an individual prefers
two spoons of sugar with every cup of tea and has one cup of tea, then sugar becomes
irrelevant after two spoons. For such preferences, complementarity between the goods
implies that at any consumption bundle one of the two goods is saturated and therefore
rendered irrelevant. Theorem 2 axiomatizes a generalized version of Leontief (GL)
preferences.
Apart from the notion of irrelevance, the other key concept that is central for our
axiomatizations is an unhappy set. Given a preference relation a set of consumption
bundles is said to be an unhappy set if every bundle outside this set is preferred to all
bundles inside. This is meant to capture the state of a poor person who has extreme
urge to come out of poverty. For SSI preferences, the subsistence zone is the largest
unhappy set that has the property that the non-basic good is irrelevant at every bundle
of the set. But for GL preferences if there is a set of consumption bundles such that a
certain good is irrelevant at every bundle of the set, it can never be an unhappy set.
Thus roughly speaking, SSI and GL preferences are characterized by the presence or
the absence of unhappiness in irrelevance. It is a case of too little versus too much.
Irrelevance of the non-basic good in SSI preferences stems from the fact that there is
too little of the basic good, but for GL preferences, irrelevance of a good is driven by
too much of that good in relation to the other good.
SSI preferences share some properties with lexicographic preferences, but there are
important differences.7 For a consumer who is in the subsistence zone under SSI,
the preference ordering over all bundles having different amounts of the basic good
follows lexicographic order. But this order breaks down for any two bundles in the
subsistence zone with the same amount of the basic good. In contrast to a lexicographic
preference, such bundles lie on the same indifferent curve under SSI. This is why unlike
a lexicographic preference, SSI is continuous.
A closely related paper is by Basu and Van (1998), who study a model of child
labour by using subsistence and lexicographic ordering to define the preference of a
household over two goods: a consumption good and a binary choice on whether or not
to send the child to work. Under their preference a household sends its child to work
only if its consumption without child labor income drops below the subsistence level.
In contrast to SSI, this preference is discontinuous and it induces lexicographic order in
the non-subsistence zone. Our paper contributes to the literature of consumer behavior
by providing a theoretical framework that can be useful to reexamine different issues
of consumption choice in the specific context of the decision making problem of the
poor.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the analytical framework in Section 2.
We axiomatize SSI preferences in Section 3. In Section 4 we present an axiomatization
6See Section 2.2 for examples of SSI that illustrate aspects not captured by Stone-Geary functions.
7See Fishburn (1975) for an axiomatization of lexicographic preferences. Axiomatizations of other
different consumer preferences include Milnor (1974), Maskin (1979), Segal and Sobel (2002). The
main difference of our approach from this literature is that our axioms are on the regions of irrelevance
embedded in SSI and GL preferences.
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of GL preferences. We conclude in Section 5 where we discuss the key insights provided
by SSI preferences. Proofs of the results are provided in the appendix.
2 The analytical framework
Consider the problem of an individual in a two-good setting where the set of goods
is {1, 2}. The individual has a consumption set X = X1 × X2 where Xi = R+ for
i ∈ {1, 2}, and X = R2+. A consumption bundle is x = (x1, x2) ∈ X where xi stands
for the amount of good i. Generic points in X will be denoted by x, y, z. If for all
i ∈ {1, 2}: (a) xi > yi, then we say x > y and (b) xi ≥ yi, then x ≥ y.
The individual’s preference on X is defined using the binary relation % where
“x % y” stands for “the individual prefers x to y”. The strict preference is defined as
x  y ⇔ [x % y] and [not y % x]. The indifference relation is defined as x ∼ y ⇔ [x % y]
and [y % x]. Throughout we consider preference relations on X that are rational,
continuous and monotone (monotone refers to weak monotonicity, that is, for any
x, y ∈ X with x > y, we have x  y).
2.1 SSI preferences
A basic necessity such as food has two key features. The first feature is the subsistence
requirement: the individual requires a minimum critical level of the necessity. If this
requirement is not met, other goods are not useful. The second feature is saturation.
Beyond a point, consuming more of it may not be beneficial. For a preference relation
in a two-good setting, the common aspect of these two features is ‘irrelevance’ in one
of the two goods.
Definition 1 Good 2 is irrelevant at a bundle x if x ∼ (x1, y2) for all y2 > x2. Similarly
good 1 is irrelevant at a bundle x if x ∼ (y1, x2) for all y1 > x1. For i ∈ {1, 2}, good i
is relevant at a bundle x if it is not irrelevant there.
Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. We say that a bundle y involves xi if yi = xi. Thus, the set
of all bundles involving xi is {y ∈ X|yi = xi}.
Definition 2 Consider a preference relation % on X which is rational, continuous and
monotone. It is subsistence and saturation induced irrelevance preference (or an SSI
preference) with respect to good 1 if it satisfies the following properties.
(I) Subsistence: ∃ Q ∈ (0,∞) such that
(a) Subsistence zone [0, Q]: for every x1 ∈ [0, Q], good 2 is irrelevant at all
bundles involving x1;
(b) Weak non-subsistence zone (Q,∞): for every x1 > Q, ∃ y1 ∈ (Q, x1) such
that good 2 is relevant at some bundle involving y1.
(II) Weak saturation: ∃ x2 ∈ X2 and Q(x2) ∈ R+ such that good 1 is irrelevant at x
if x1 ≥ Q(x2) and it is relevant at x if x1 < Q(x2).
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Definition 2 has zones of subsistence, weak non-subsistence and weak saturation in
preferences. Here good 1 is the basic good and Q stands for the subsistence threshold.
good 2 is the non-basic good.8 For instance, if good 1 represents food, then Q stands
for the critical amount of food that corresponds to the minimum calorie requirements
of the individual. The subsistence zone specifies that if the consumption of good 1 is
below this critical level, then good 2 does not have any benefit (Property I(a)).
Property I(b) says that once the amount of good 1 exceeds Q we can always find
a bundle with lower amount of good 1 at which good 2 is relevant. In other words,
for any x1 = Q + ε (where ε > 0, no matter how small), there is y1 ∈ (Q,Q + ε) such
that good 2 is relevant at some bundle involving y1. Once x1 > Q, we are in the weak
non-subsistence zone in that the total irrelevance of good 2 disappears there. As we
shall see, the properties of SSI preference ensure the existence of a subset of the weak
non-subsistence zone that is a non-subsistence zone in a stronger sense.
Property (II) of the definition says that there is at least one x2 ∈ X2 and a corre-
sponding threshold Q(x2) such that for consumption bundles involving x2, any unit of
good 1 beyond Q(x2) has no benefit. This captures the saturation aspect of a basic
good in a weak sense.9
An SSI preference has two implications that are stated in Observation 1. First,
there is a natural order between the threshold of subsistence and any threshold of
weak saturation: for any x2 ∈ X2 where weak saturation holds, we have Q ≤ Q(x2).
Second, for any consumption bundle where the amount of the basic good exceeds
the weak saturation level (that is, x1 > Q(x2)), the non-basic good is necessarily
beneficial. Formally, call an interval (a,∞) ⊆ X1 a strong non-subsistence zone if
for every x1 ∈ (a,∞) there is a bundle involving x1 at which good 2 is relevant.
Observation 1 shows that if weak saturation holds for x2 ∈ X2, then the interval
(Q(x2),∞) is a strong non-subsistence zone. That is, for every x1 > Q(x2), there is a
bundle involving x1 at which good 2 is relevant.
Observation 1 For an SSI preference consider any x2 ∈ X2 at which weak saturation
(Property (II)) holds. Then Q ≤ Q(x2), with strict inequality if x2 > 0. Moreover, the
interval (Q(x2),∞) is a strong non-subsistence zone.
Before presenting the axiomatization of SSI preferences, we look at certain aspects of
consumer behavior under this preference that distinguishes it from related preferences.
2.2 Consumer behavior under SSI preferences
2.2.1 SSI preferences and Stone-Geary utility functions
Stony-Geary utility functions are often used to model subsistence. The first two exam-
ples point out how certain implications of subsistence are better captured by SSI prefer-
ences in comparison to Stone-Geary utility functions. For both examples, u : R2+ → R
8Henceforth when we refer to an SSI preference, it will be implicit that it is with respect to good
1, that is, good 1 is the basic good and good 2 is the non-basic good.
9A stronger notion of saturation requires that such a property holds for every x2 ∈ X2. Formally,
there is strong saturation with respect to good 1 if for every x2 ∈ X2, ∃ Q(x2) ∈ R+ such that good
1 is irrelevant at x if x1 ≥ Q(x2) and it is relevant at x if x1 < Q(x2).
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is a utility function that represents an SSI preference. The prices of goods 1, 2 are
denoted by p1, p2 > 0 and the income of the consumer is w > 0, so that the utility
maximization problem for the consumer is
choose x ∈ R2+ to maximize u(x) subject to p1x1 + p2x2 ≤ w (1)
Example 1 Let 0 < Q < Q <∞. Define the net-usefulness function g : X1 → R+ as
g(x1) :=

0 if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ Q,
x1 −Q if Q < x1 < Q,
Q−Q if x1 ≥ Q.
(2)
That is, g(x1) = max{x1 −Q, 0}+ min{Q− x1, 0}. The net-usefulness function g(.) is
continuous, non-decreasing and piecewise linear. This function captures the usefulness
of the basic good beyond subsistence requirement. Let 0 < α < 1. Using the net-
usefulness function, consider the utility function u(x) = min{x1, Q} + [g(x1)]αx1−α2 ,
that is,
u(x) =

x1 if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ Q,
Q+
(
x1 −Q
)α
x1−α2 if Q < x1 < Q,
Q+
(
Q−Q)α x1−α2 if x1 ≥ Q. (3)
The preference represented by (3) is an SSI preference with strong saturation (where
saturation threshold Q(x2) = Q for all x2 ∈ X2). Denote w(p1) = p1Q, w(p1) = p1Q
and ŵ(p1) = w(p1) + (1− α)(w(p1)−w(p1))/α. When u(x) is given by (3), the unique
solution x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2) to the utility maximization problem (1) is
x∗ =

(
w
p1
, 0
)
if w ∈ (0, w(p1)],(
Q+ α(w−w(p1))
p1
, (1−α)(w−w(p1))
p2
)
if w ∈ (w(p1), ŵ(p1)) ,(
Q,w − p1Q
)
if w ≥ ŵ(p1).
(4)
Observe that the utility function of (3) is different from a Stone-Geary utility function.
ForQ < x1 < Q in (3), u(x) resembles a Stone-Geary function, but there is a qualitative
difference. The minimum income required to achieve the subsistence consumption Q
is a function of p1: w(p1). This important aspect, intrinsic to subsistence, is missing
from Stone-Geary utility functions as it implicitly assumes that any consumer always
has enough wealth to stay outside the subsistence zone without any reference to the
price of the basic good. However, an increase in the price of certain basic good such as
foodgrains may very well push a consumer from non-subsistence to subsistence zone.
Also note that if w ≥ w(p1), the consumer can afford the saturation level Q of
the basic good. However, for the interval [w(p1), ŵ(p1)), it is optimal to buy less than
saturation level of the basic good and more of the non-basic good.
2.2.2 Subsistence inertia
By subsistence inertia we mean a situation where a consumer continues to buy only the
basic good even outside the subsistence zone. That is, even if a consumer has adequate
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income to buy more than subsistence level of the basic good (w > p1Q) so that the
non-basic good is beneficial, it might still be optimal to not to buy the non-basic good
at all.
Example 2 Let 0 < Q < Q < ∞. Using the net-usefulness function g(.) defined in
Example 1, consider the utility function u(x) = min{x1, Q}+ g(x1)x2, that is,
u(x) =

x1 if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ Q,
x1 + (x1 −Q)x2 if Q < x1 < Q,
Q+ (Q−Q)x2 if x1 ≥ Q.
(5)
This utility function also represents an SSI preference (with strong saturation). For
u(x) given by (5), the unique solution x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2) to the utility maximization problem
(1) is as follows where as before w(p1) = p1Q and w(p1) = p1Q.
For p2 < w(p1)− w(p1), we have
x∗ =

(
w
p1
, 0
)
if w ∈ (0, w(p1) + p2],(
w+w(p1)+p2
2p1
, w−w(p1)−p2
2p2
)
if w ∈ (w(p1) + p2, 2w(p1)− w(p1)− p2) ,(
Q,w − w(p1)
)
if w ≥ 2w(p1)− w(p1)− p2.
(6)
For p2 ≥ w(p1)− w(p1), we have
x∗ =
{ (
w
p1
, 0
)
if w ∈ (0, w(p1)],(
Q,w − w(p1)
)
if w ≥ w(p1).
(7)
If w > w(p1), the consumer can afford more than the subsistence level Q of good 1
and good 2 can be beneficial. Yet it may be the case in (6) and (7) where it is optimal
not to buy good 2 at all. For (7), buying good 2 is optimal only when w > w(p1).
However, for (6), although the consumer can afford the saturation level Q of good 1 if
w > w(p1), it may still be optimal to buy less than Q of good 1 and more of good 2.
2.2.3 SSI preference with weak saturation
Both the examples considered so far have SSI preferences with strong saturation. This
is an example of an SSI preference with weak rather than strong saturation.
Example 3 For x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ consider the following continuous utility function
u(x) =

x1 if x1 ≤ 1,
1 + min{√(x1 − 1)x2, x2} if (1 < x1 ≤ 2) or (x1 > 2 and x2 ≤ 1),
1 + min
{√
(x1 − 1)x2, 1+
√
1+4(x1−1)(x2−1)
2
}
if x1 > 2 and x2 > 1.
Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 1. This utility function
represents an SSI preference in which the subsistence zone is [0, 1], that is, Q = 1.
Note that (1,∞) ⊂ X1 is a strong (and hence weak) non-subsistence zone. The weak
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saturation property holds for x2 ∈ [0, 1]. For any such x2, there is Q(x2) = x2 + 1 (see
Figure 1) such that good 1 is irrelevant at x if x1 ≥ Q(x2) and relevant if x1 < Q(x2).
Note that Q(0) = Q and Q(x2) > Q for x2 ∈ (0, 1]. As shown in Observation 1,
(x2 + 1,∞) ⊂ X1 is a strong non-subsistence zone for every x2 ∈ [0, 1]. Finally observe
that at any bundle with x1 > 1 and x2 > 1, both goods are relevant.
To see a particular context in which the properties of Example 3 fits well, suppose
good 1 is food and good 2 is physical activity, broadly construed. For instance, good 2
can stand for labor which, when productive, brings monetary benefits. In the subsis-
tence zone the individual does not have sufficient nutrition, so he is too weak to have
any benefit from physical activity. Above this zone, for any x2 ≤ 1, there is a threshold
(given by x2 + 1) beyond which good 1 is not useful. This is because to sustain low
levels of physical activity the individual does not require an ever increasing amount of
food and saturation is reached after a while. In particular, when x2 = 0 (no physical
activity), saturation is reached at the subsistence level (see Figure 1). However, there
is no point of saturation once x2 > 1. For any such x2, a higher amount of good 1
makes the individual better off. This is because for jobs that require higher amount of
labor, better nutrition makes labor more productive.
These examples demonstrate a glimpse of the intricacies of consumer behavior that
can be associated with SSI preferences. Whether saturation in an SSI preference is
weak or strong depends on how the non-basic good relates with the basic good. In the
first two examples, good 2 is considered to be a non-basic consumption good, which
does not share the same relation that physical activity has with food as in the last
example.
9
2.2.4 SSI and lexicographic preferences
The preference relation % on X is a lexicographic preference with linear order 1 <0 2
on the two goods if the following hold: x % y if either x1 > y1 or [x1 = y1 and x2 ≥ y2].
-
O
6
good 1
good 2
rz
z1
z2
ry
x1
y2
rxx2
Figure 2
Consider two bundles that are in the subsistence zone of an SSI preference. If they have
different amounts of good 1 (like points x = (x1, x2) and z = (z1, z2) in Figure 2), then
their preference ordering in the SSI is same as lexicographic. However, if the bundles
have the same amount of good 1 (like points x = (x1, x2) and y = (x1, y2) in Figure 2),
the orderings of SSI and lexicographic are very different. Such bundles lie on the same
indifference curve for SSI, while for lexicographic, they are strictly ordered in terms of
the amount of good 2. Indeed, SSI preference is continuous while lexicographic is not.
On the other hand, lexicographic is strong monotone, while SSI is not.
2.3 Unhappy sets
We introduce the notion of unhappy sets which will be used in our axiomatizations.
Definition 3 For a preference relation % on X, a set S ⊆ X is an unhappy set if for
any y 6∈ S, y  x for every x ∈ S.
Remarks For any preference relation % on X, the empty set and the set X are both
unhappy sets. Any lower contour set or strict lower contour set is an unhappy set. For
any rational and continuous preference relation on Rn+, if S is an unhappy set which is
a non empty proper subset of Rn+, then S is either open or closed, but not both. If S
is closed, it is a lower contour set and if S is open, it is a strict lower contour set.
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3 Axiomatization of SSI preferences
We characterize SSI preferences using Axiom 1 and Axiom 2. Axiom 1 requires that
irrelevance of the non-basic good is at least partially driven by inadequacy of the basic
good. Axiom 2 requires that there exists at least one bundle where the basic good is
irrelevant. Thus for each of the two goods there is a structural transition in preference.
Theorem 1 shows that this requirement uniquely characterizes SSI preferences.
To state the axioms, for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j, denote by Bi the set of all con-
sumption bundles at which good j is irrelevant. That is,
B1 := {x ∈ X|good 2 is irrelevant at x} and B2 := {x ∈ X|good 1 is irrelevant at x}
Axiom 1 Unhappiness driven irrelevance: B1 has an unhappy subset of positive area.
Axiom 2 B2 is non-empty.
Theorem 1 Consider a preference relation % on X = R2+ which is rational, continu-
ous and monotone. The following statements are equivalent.
(SSI1) The preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 1 and Axiom 2.
(SSI2) The preference relation % on X is a SSI preference with respect to good 1.
Idea of the proof: To see that an SSI preference satisfies Axiom 1 and Axiom 2,
first observe that the set S0 = {x ∈ X | x1 ∈ [0, Q)} is a subset of B1 since good 2 is
irrelevant for any consumption bundle in S0. Moreover, by monotonicity of preference
any bundle in X \S0 is strictly preferred to any bundle in S0. Hence S0 is an unhappy
set of positive area, so Axiom 1 holds. Property (II) of SSI implies Axiom 2.
To prove that Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 imply SSI preference we use the following
chain of arguments. First, by Axiom 1 there is a set S ⊆ B1 which is an unhappy set
of positive area. Therefore, there exists x ∈ S such that x1 > 0 (see Figure 3).
By monotonicity of preference, x is weakly preferred to any point in the rectangle
OExA. Since S is an unhappy set, any point in this rectangle must be in S and hence
in B1. In particular for all points lying on the line OE, good 2 is irrelevant and hence all
indifference curves are parallel vertical lines in this region. This indicates the existence
of a subsistence zone; in particular, the interval OE is a subset of the subsistence zone.
To fully characterize the subsistence zone we have to use Axiom 2.
Axiom 2 requires non-emptiness of B2 and hence there exists y = (y1, y2) ∈ B2.
This gives rise to weak saturation. The point (y1, 0) must be to the right of OE,
otherwise two indifference curves will intersect. Finally the subsistence zone must be
bounded since (y1, 0) and anything to the right of it cannot belong to the subsistence
zone. Existence of weak non-subsistence zone follows.
One implication of Axiom 1 is B2 cannot have an unhappy set of positive area, for
if it does, then there will be a region where indifference curves are parallel horizontal
lines each meeting the horizontal axis. But then they will intersect with the indifference
curves of the interval OE (see IC(y)in Figure 3). Given this, an alternative formulation
of the axioms (modulo relabeling of the two goods) would be: (i) at least one of B1, B2
has an unhappy subset of positive area and (ii) B1, B2 are non-empty.
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3.1 Robustness of the axioms of SSI preference
A Leontief preference satisfies Axiom 2 but not Axiom 1. Let us now check the robust-
ness of Axiom 2. This axiom is useful not only to generate weak saturation, but it is also
necessary for the existence of a non-subsistence zone. Without it, a non-subsistence
zone might not exist. Without a reference to a situation of non-subsistence, the notion
of subsistence may not be meaningful.
Corollary 1 Consider a preference relation % on X = R2+ which is rational, contin-
uous and monotone. The following statements are equivalent.
(S1) The preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 1.
(S2) For the preference relation % on X, either property (I) of Definition 2 holds, or
good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles.
Recall that in property (I) of Definition 2, the subsistence zone is [0, Q] for 0 <
Q <∞, which results in a weak non-subsistence zone (Q,∞). The preference in (S2) of
Corollary 1 includes the case where Q =∞, in which case there is no non-subsistence
zone at all, rendering good 2 to be irrelevant at all bundles.
4 Generalized Leontief preferences
In the previous section we characterized an SSI preference that has the feature that
each good had stretches of irrelevance. The only well-known preference where irrele-
vance in both goods exists is a Leontief preference. For this preference at least one
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good is irrelevant at any bundle x ∈ X. Thus irrelevance spans the entire domain of
preferences. Formally, a preference relation % on X is a Leontief preference if there ex-
ists a > 0 such that for any x, y ∈ X, x % y if and only if min{ax1, x2} ≥ min{ay1, y2}.
In that case there is a linear function F (x1) = ax1 such that given any x1 ∈ X1, both
goods are irrelevant at (x1, F (x1)), good 1 is irrelevant at (y1, F (x1)) for any y1 > x1
and good 2 is irrelevant at (x1, y2) for any y2 > F (x1). The ratio 1/a is the fixed
coefficient of substitutability between the two goods. However, there is no apparent
pressing need to keep the substitution fixed across the two goods. For example, with
one cup of tea a day, an individual may want two spoons of sugar, but if the same
individual drinks ten cups of tea a day, he may take less than twenty spoons of sugar
if he is diabetic. Thus for Leontief preferences the proportion of substitutability may
well vary as we vary the amount of any one good. Incorporating this generality of vari-
able substitutability, ceteris paribus, we define the ‘generalized Leontief’ preference as
follows.
Definition 4 The preference relation % on X is a generalized Leontief preference (or
a GL preference) if there exists surjective10 and increasing function F : X1 → X2 with
F (0) = 0 such that for any x1 ∈ X1:
(i) at any bundle (x1, F (x1)), both goods 1, 2 are irrelevant;
(ii) good 1 is irrelevant at any bundle (y1, F (x1)) for y1 > x1;
(iii) good 2 is irrelevant at any bundle (x1, y2) for y2 > F (x1).
Observe that since F is surjective and increasing, it is also one-to-one and contin-
uous. The domain of the inverse function of F is X2. Recall that
B1 = {x ∈ X|good 2 is irrelevant at x} and B2 = {x ∈ X|good 1 is irrelevant at x}
To axiomatize GL preferences, it will be useful to define
A1 := {x1 ∈ X1|∃x2 ∈ X2 such that x = (x1, x2) ∈ B1} and
A2 := {x2 ∈ X2|∃x1 ∈ X1 such that x = (x1, x2) ∈ B2}.
That is, for i 6= j, Ai ⊆ Xi is the set of all elements xi for which there exists a bundle
involving xi at which good j is irrelevant.
Axiom 3 Irrelevance without unhappiness: Neither B1 nor B2 has an unhappy subset
of positive area.
Axiom 4 Spanning axiom: A1 = X1, A2 = X2 and B1 ∪B2 = X.
We axiomatize GL preferences using these two axioms. Monotonicity of preference
ensures that B1 and B2 both cannot have an unhappy set of positive area (see Lemma
1 of the Appendix), implying that Axiom 3 is the compliment of Axiom 1 (modulo
relabeling of the goods).
10A function F : X1 → X2 is a surjective function if for any x2 ∈ X2, ∃ x1 ∈ X1 such that
F (x1) = x2.
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Theorem 2 Consider a preference relation % on X = R2+ which is rational, continu-
ous and monotone. The following statements are equivalent.
(GL1) The preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 3 and Axiom 4.
(GL2) The preference relation % on X is a generalized Leontief preference.
Idea of the proof: For GL preferences, Ai = Xi for i = 1, 2. Moreover, B1 =
{x ∈ X | x2 ≥ F (x1)}, B2 = {x ∈ X | x2 ≤ F (x1)}, implying that B1 ∪ B2 = X, so
Axiom 4 holds. For any x ∈ Bi, there exists y 6∈ Bi such that x ∼ y, so there does not
exist an unhappy subset of Bi. Thus Axiom 3 also holds.
To see the converse consider any x = (x1, x2) > (0, 0) and, given Axiom 4, assume
without loss of generality that x ∈ B1. If (x1, 0) ∈ B1, then S = {y ∈ X | y1 ∈ [0, x1)}
is an unhappy set of positive area. Since B1 ∪ B2 = X (Axiom 4) and indifference
curves cannot intersect it follows that S ⊂ B1, contradicting Axiom 3. So we must
have (x1, 0) ∈ B2. Then the indifference curve containing x cannot meet the horizontal
axis. Hence there exists y2 ∈ (0, x2] such that (x1, y2) ∈ B2 and (x1, z2) ∈ B1 for all
z2 ≥ y2. Taking F (x1) = y2 and using Ai = Xi (for i = 1, 2) it can be shown that F (.)
is an surjective and increasing function with F (0) = 0.
4.1 Robustness of axioms
Axiom 3 and Axiom 4 have three requirements: (i) Ai = Xi for i = 1, 2, (ii) B1∪B2 = X
and (iii) none of B1 and B2 has an unhappy subset of positive area. In each of the
following examples, only one of requirements (i)-(iii) is violated, and we see that we do
not get a generalized Leontief preference.
Example 4 Consider the preference represented by utility function u where k > 0.
u(x1, x2) =
{
min {x1/(k − x1), x2} if x1 < k,
x2 if x1 ≥ k.
Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 4. For this example,
B1 ∪ B2 = X and none of B1 and B2 has an unhappy set of positive area. However,
A1 = [0, k) although A2 = X2. This preference is not GL but is “locally Leontief” (for
x1 < k) with saturation of good 1 at x1 = k.
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Example 5 Consider the preference represented by the utility function
u(x1, x2) =

x2 if x2 ≤ x1/2,
(x1 + x2)/3 if x1/2 < x2 < 2x1,
x1 if x2 ≥ 2x1.
Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 5. For this example,
Axiom 3 holds and Ai = Xi for i = 1, 2. However, B1 ∪B2 6= X.
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Example 6 Consider the preference represented by utility function u where k > 0.
u(x1, x2) =
{
x1 if x1 ≤ k,
k + min{x1 − k, x2} if x1 > k.
Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 6.
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For Example 6, Axiom 4 holds. But Axiom 3 does not hold since B1 has an unhappy
subset of positive area. The set {(x1, x2)|x1 ∈ [0, k], x2 ∈ X2} ⊂ B1 is an unhappy
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set. We get “locally Leontief” (for x1 > k) and subsistence with respect to good 1 for
x1 ≤ k.
5 Concluding remarks
As poverty and hunger continue to pose major challenges for development, subsistence
remains a useful concept for policymakers. However, in spite of its wide use, the
treatment of subsistence in the literature of consumer theory is far from adequate.
Seeking to fill this gap we introduce subsistence and saturation in preferences (SSI) in
a standard consumer theory framework with two goods: a basic good and a non-basic
good. In so doing, we formalize Bentham’s notions of subsistence and abundance. The
modeling of subsistence and the axiomatization of these preferences are based on two
key concepts: (i) irrelevance of a good in certain consumption bundles and (ii) unhappy
sets. These concepts are also used subsequently to axiomatize a generalized version of
Leontief (GL) preferences. For SSI preferences, irrelevance together with the presence
of unhappy sets generates subsistence. By contrast, for GL preferences, if there is a
set of consumption bundles such that a certain good is irrelevant at every bundle of
the set, it can never be an unhappy set.
As illustrated in Section 2.2, SSI preferences bring out certain aspects of consumer
behavior that are ignored by Stone-Geary utility functions. These utility functions
implicitly assume that consumers always have enough income to stay outside the sub-
sistence zone regardless of the price of the basic good. By contrast, SSI preferences
demonstrate that a price rise of the basic good may well take a consumer from non-
subsistence to the subsistence zone. SSI preferences can thus provide better insights
for poverty analysis. For instance, whether a specific instance of poverty is temporary
(due to a fluctuation of food prices) or chronic (driven by persistently low levels of
income) can be better understood from these preferences.
SSI preferences also bring out another aspect of consumer behavior which we call
subsistence inertia. It may be the case that for moderate levels of income, it is optimal
for a consumer to buy only the basic good even though he is outside the subsistence
zone. Therefore the absence of the non-basic good in the consumption basket does not
necessarily imply that the individual is in his subsistence zone. This insight can be
useful in avoiding misallocation of resources while implementing policies that seek to
specifically target the poor.
In conclusion, in this paper we have presented a microeconomic analysis of subsis-
tence consumption. The theoretical framework of this paper can be useful to better
understand decision making behavior of the poor.
6 Appendix
Proof of Observation 1: Let x2 ∈ X2 be such that property (II) holds there. For
the first part, suppose on the contrary that Q > Q(x2). Then (Q(x2), x2) ∼ (Q, x2)
(by property (II)) and (Q, x2) ∼ (Q, y2) for any y2 > x2 (by property (I)(a)). By
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transitivity, (Q(x2), x2) ∼ (Q, y2) for any y2 > x2 which violates monotonicity. So we
must have Q ≤ Q(x2).
Let x2 > 0. If Q = Q(x2) = Q, then (Q, 0) ∼ (Q, x2) (by (I)(a)) and (Q, x2) ∼ x for
any x1 > Q (by (II)), implying (Q, 0) ∼ x for any x1 > Q which violates monotonicity.
So we must have Q < Q(x2) if x2 > 0.
To prove that (Q(x2),∞) is a strong non-subsistence zone with respect to good 1,
we have to show that for any x1 > Q(x2), good 2 is relevant at some bundle involving
x1. Suppose, on the contrary, ∃ x1 > Q(x2) such that good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles
involving x1. Then x ∼ (x1, y2) for any y2 > x2. But since x1 > Q(x2), by property
(II) we have x ∼ (Q(x2), x2). By transitivity, (x1, y2) ∼ (Q(x2), x2), which violates
monotonicity, a contradiction.
6.1 Irrelevance: some implications
We define two functions f1, f2 : X → {0, 1} that captures the notion of irrelevance.
f1(x) ≡
{
0 if x ∼ (y1, x2) for all y1 ≥ x1,
1 otherwise.
f2(x) ≡
{
0 if x ∼ (x1, y2) for all y2 ≥ x2,
1 otherwise.
The function f1(x) captures irrelevance of good 1 at bundle x. Similarly, the function
f2(x) captures irrelevance of good 2 at bundle x. Observation 2 shows that if a good is
irrelevant at a bundle, then it continues to remain so for all bundles where its quantity
is increased keeping the quantity of the other good unchanged. Observation 2 also
shows that the converse is true, which is proved using continuity of the preference
relation.
Observation 2 (i) f2(x) = 0 ⇔ f2(x1, y2) = 0 for all y2 > x2 and (ii) f1(x) = 0 ⇔
f1(y1, x2) = 0 for all y1 > x1.
Proof: We prove (i), proof of (ii) is similar. Let f2(x) = 0. Then x ∼ (x1, y2) for any
y2 > x2. Hence (x1, y2) ∼ (x1, z2) for any z2 > y2 > x2, implying that f2(x1, y2) = 0.
Conversely, let f2(x1, y2) = 0 for all y2 > x2. Then (x1, y2) ∼ (x1, z2) for all z2 >
y2 > x2. Let x
n = (x1, x2+1/n) and y
n = (x1, y2+1/n) for n = 1, 2, . . . . Then x
n ∼ yn,
and hence xn % yn for n = 1, 2, . . . . Since limn→∞ xn = x and limn→∞ yn = (x1, y2), by
continuity we have x % (x1, y2). Since y2 > x2, by monotonicity we have (x1, y2) % x.
We then conclude that x ∼ (x1, y2) for any y2 > x2, proving that f2(x) = 0.
We conclude from Observation 2 that for every xi ∈ Ai, ∃ αi(xi) ∈ Xj = R+ such
that
fj(x) =
{
0 if xj ≥ αi(xi),
1 otherwise.
(8)
It follows from (8) that Bi = {x ∈ X|xi ∈ Ai, xj ≥ αi(xi)}. For xi ∈ Ai, let Bi(xi)
be the set of all bundles involving xi at which good j is irrelevant, that is, Bi(xi) :=
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{y ∈ X|yi = xi, yj ≥ αi(xi)}. It is immediate that Bi = ∪xi∈AiBi(xi). For any xi ∈ Xi,
define the set of all bundles involving xi as Mi(xi) := {y ∈ X|yi = xi}. Observe that
for any xi ∈ Ai, Bi(xi) ⊆ Mi(xi). Moreover Bi(xi) = Mi(xi) if and only if αi(xi) = 0.
The last equality implies that good j is irrelevant at all bundles involving xi.
Observation 3
(i) Let xi, yi ∈ Ai and yi < xi. Then x  y for any x ∈ Bi(xi) and y ∈ Bi(yi).
(ii) Let xi > 0. If Bi(yi) = Mi(yi) for all yi ∈ [0, xi), then xi ∈ Ai and Bi(xi) =
Mi(xi).
Proof: Without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), let i = 1.
(i) Let y ∈ B1(y1). Consider any z2 > max{y2, α1(x1)}. Then (x1, z2) ∈ B1(x1).
Since x1 > y1 and z2 > y2, by monotonicity (x1, z2)  y. Since (x1, z2) ∼ x for any
x ∈ B1(x1) the result follows from transitivity.
(ii) Consider two sequences xn = (x1 − 1/n, x2), yn = (x1 − 1/n, 0) where x2 > 0
and n > 1/x1. Since y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) = 0 for y1 ∈ [0, x1), we have xn, yn ∈
M1(x1 − 1/n) = B1(x1 − 1/n). Hence xn ∼ yn and in particular, yn % xn. Since
limn→∞ xn = x and limn→∞ yn = (x1, 0), by continuity we have (x1, 0) % x. Since
x2 > 0, by monotonicity we have x % (x1, 0), implying that x ∼ (x1, 0) for any x2 > 0.
This proves the result.
Consider any two arbitrary bundles at both of which good j is irrelevant. The
first part of Observation 3 shows that the preference ordering of these two bundles is
completely determined by amounts of good i. The second part shows that if for any
yi < xi, good j is irrelevant at all bundles involving yi, then good j is also irrelevant
at all bundles involving xi.
6.2 SSI preferences
For i = 1, 2, a set S ⊆ Bi is a maximal unhappy subset of Bi if (a) S is an unhappy set
and (b) @ T ⊆ Bi such that T is an unhappy set and S ⊂ T. Lemma 1 (that follows)
will be used to prove Theorem 1. Part (I) of Lemma 1 shows that if for some x1 > 0,
good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles involving any y1 ∈ [0, x1] then Axiom 1 holds. Part
(II) shows that the converse is also true. Moreover, if Axiom 1 holds, then B1 has a
unique maximal unhappy subset S which has the property that if x = (x1, x2) ∈ S,
then (x1, 0) ∈ S and consequently good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles involving x1.
Finally if Axiom 1 holds, then B2 cannot have an unhappy subset of positive area.
Given Axiom 1, an immediate consequence of Lemma 1(I) is that the set T (x1) =
{y ∈ X | y1 ∈ [0, x1]} ⊆ B1 is an unhappy set and the indifference curves in T (x1) are
all parallel to the X2 axis.
Lemma 1 (I) If x1 > 0, [0, x1] ⊆ A1 and B1(y1) = M1(y1) for all y1 ∈ [0, x1], then
Axiom 1 holds.
(II) Suppose Axiom 1 holds.
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(i) Let S ⊆ B1 be an unhappy set of positive area. If x ∈ S, then α1(y1) = 0
for all y1 ∈ [0, x1] and ∪y1∈[0,x1]B1(y1) = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) ⊆ S.
(ii) B1 has a unique maximal unhappy subset S, which has the following prop-
erties: Either (a) S = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) or (b) S = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) for some
x1 ∈ (0,∞), or (c) S = ∪y1∈R+M1(y1) = R2+.
(iii) Suppose (a) or (b) of (ii) holds. Then for every x1 > x1, ∃ y1 ∈ (x1, x1)
such that either y1 /∈ A1, or y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) > 0.
(iv) B2 cannot have an unhappy subset of positive area.
Proof of Lemma 1: (I) Let y1 ∈ [0, x1]. Let T := ∪y1∈[0,x1)B1(y1) = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) ⊆
B1. To prove that T is an unhappy set, first we show that x  y for any y ∈ T. Observe
that x ∈M1(x1) = B1(x1). Let y ∈ T. Then y ∈M1(y1) = B1(y1) for some y1 < x1.By
Observation 3(i), we conclude that x  y.
To complete the proof we show that z  y for any z such that z1 > x1. Monotonicity
of preference implies that z % (x1, 0) for any such z. From the preceding paragraph,
we have (x1, 0)  y for any y ∈ T. By transitivity, z  y for any y ∈ T. This proves
that T is an unhappy set. As x1 > 0, the area of T is positive. So Axiom 1 holds.
(II) (i) Let S ⊆ B1 has positive area. Then ∃ x ∈ S where x1 > 0. Consider
such x ∈ S. Since y ∼ x for all y ∈ B1(x1) and S is an unhappy set, we must have
B1(x1) ⊆ S.
Next observe that if α1(x1) > 0 for some x ∈ S, we can find y such that y1 = x1
and y2 ∈ [0, α1(x1)). Then y /∈ B1, so we have y /∈ S. But x % y (by continuity and
monotonicity of %), which contradicts that S is an unhappy set. Hence for any x ∈ S,
we must have α1(x1) = 0, implying that B1(x1) = M1(x1) ⊆ S.
Now we show that if x ∈ S, then y ∈ S for any y such that y1 < x1. To see this,
consider z such that z1 = x1 and z2 > y2. Since B1(x1) = M1(x1) ⊆ S, we have z ∈ S.
By monotonicity, z  y. As S is an unhappy set, we must have y ∈ S.
From the preceding paragraphs we conclude that if x ∈ S, then α1(y1) = 0 for all
y1 ∈ [0, x1] and ∪y1∈[0,x1]B1(y1) = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) ⊆ S. This proves (i).
(ii) First observe that if S, T are two subsets of B1 that are both unhappy sets, then
either S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S. If neither holds, then ∃ x ∈ S, y ∈ T such that x /∈ T, y /∈ S. If
x1 = y1, then y ∈ M1(x1) ⊆ S, a contradiction. So x1 6= y1. W.l.o.g., let y1 < x1. But
then from the last paragraph, we have y ∈M1(y1) ⊆ S, again a contradiction.
Therefore, if Axiom 1 holds, then it has a unique maximal unhappy subset S and
this set has positive area. From part (i) we conclude that either S = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1)
or S = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) for some 0 < x1 <∞, or S = ∪y1∈R+M1(y1) = R2+.
(iii) If (a) or (b) of (ii) holds, then y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) = 0 for all y1 ∈ [0, x1] (for
(b), the result for y1 = x1 follows from Observation 3(ii)). Suppose, on the contrary ∃
x1 > x1 where the assertion (iii) does not hold. Then for every y1 ∈ (x1, x1), we have
y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) = 0, so that B1(y1) = M1(y1). Let S˜∗ := ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1). Then
S ⊂ S˜∗ ⊆ B1. By part (I), S˜∗ is an unhappy set, which contradicts (II)(ii).
(iv) Suppose on the contrary both B1, B2 have unhappy subsets of positive area.
Then by part (II)(i), for i = 1, 2, ∃ xi > 0 such that xi ∈ Ai and αi(xi) = 0. Then
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(x1, 0) ∼ x (since α1(x1) = 0) and (0, x2) ∼ x ∼ (y1, x2) for any y1 > x1 (since
α2(x2) = 0). This implies (x1, 0) ∼ (y1, x2). But since y1 > x1 and x2 > 0, by
monotonicity we must have (y1, x2)  (x1, 0), a contradiction. This proves (iv).
Proof of Theorem 1: We first prove (SSI1)⇒ (SSI2).
Proof of property (I) (subsistence): Since Axiom 1 holds, by Lemma 1(II)(ii), B1 has
a unique maximal unhappy subset S.
Now we show that S 6= R2+. To see this, first note that since Axiom 1 holds,
by Lemma 1(II)(iv), B2 cannot have an unhappy subset of positive area. Moreover,
by Axiom 2, B2 is non-empty and so is A2. Let x2 ∈ A2, y1 > x1 ≥ α2(x2) and
y2 = x2. Then x, y ∈ B2(x2), so that x ∼ y. If S = R2+, then x, y ∈ S ⊆ B1. As
x ∈ M1(x1) = B1(x1), y ∈ M1(y1) = B1(y1) and y1 > x1, by Observation 3(i) we have
y  x, a contradiction. So we must have S 6= R2+.
From the preceding paragraph and by Lemma 1(II)(ii) we conclude that either
S = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) or S = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) for some x1 ∈ (0,∞). In either case, by
Observation 3(ii) we have α1(y1) = 0 for all y1 ∈ [0, x1]. Taking Q = x1 proves property
(I)(a) of SSI preference holds. Property (I)(b) of SSI preference with respect to good
1 follows from Lemma 1(II)(iii).
Proof of property (II) (weak saturation): Since B2 is non-empty, ∃ x2 ∈ X2 and
α2(x2) ≥ 0 such that good 1 is relevant at x if x1 < α2(x2) and it is irrelevant at x if
x1 ≥ α2(x2). Taking Q(x2) = α2(x2) proves property (II) of SSI preference holds. From
continuity and monotonicity of preference it also follows that Q = x1 ≤ Q(x2) = α2(x2)
and the inequality is strict if x2 > 0.
We now prove (SSI2)⇒(SSI1). We consider the SSI preference with respect to
good 1 and show that it satisfies Axiom 1. Observe from the subsistence property that
[0, Q] ⊆ A1 and B1(x1) = M1(x1) for all x1 ∈ [0, Q]. Then by Lemma 1(I), it follows
that Axiom 1 holds. To show that Axiom 2 holds, observe from the weak saturation
property that {x ∈ X|x1 ≥ Q} ⊆ B2 so that B2 is non-empty.
Proof of Corollary 1: We first prove (S1)⇒ (S2). Since Axiom 1 holds, by Lemma
1(II)(ii), B1 has a unique maximal unhappy subset S. If either (a) or (b) of Lemma
1(II)(ii) holds, then property (I) of Definition 2 holds. So suppose (c) of Lemma 1(II)(ii)
holds, i.e., S = R2+. Then A1 = R+ and α1(x1) = 0 for all x1 ∈ R+, implying that good
2 is irrelevant at all bundles.
To prove (S2)⇒ (S1), if property (I) of Definition 2 holds, then from the proof
of Theorem 1 it follows that Axiom 1 holds. Otherwise, B1 = R2+, which is itself an
unhappy set of positive area.
6.3 GL preferences
To prove Theorem 2 we will use the following lemmas. Given Axiom 4, Lemma 2
shows that if a good is irrelevant (relevant) at a bundle and its amount is decreased
(increased), then it continues to be irrelevant (relevant) at the new bundle.
Lemma 2 Suppose % satisfies Axiom 4.
(I) Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. For any xi ∈ Xi, fi(x) is non-decreasing in xj.
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(II) If xi ∈ Ai, then yi ∈ Ai and αi(yi) ≤ αi(xi) for all yi ∈ [0, xi).
Proof: W.l.o.g. take i = 1 and j = 2.
(I) We have to show that f2(y1, x2) ≤ f2(x) for all y1 < x1 and f2(y1, x2) ≥ f2(x)
for all y1 > x1. Since f2(.) equals 0 or 1, it is sufficient to show: (a) if f2(x) = 0, then
f2(y1, x2) = 0 for all y1 < x1 and (b) if f2(x) = 1, then f2(y1, x2) = 1 for all y1 > x1.
If (a) does not hold, then ∃ x and y1 < x1 such that f2(x) = 0 and f2(y1, x2) = 1,
i.e., (y1, x2) /∈ B1. By Axiom 4, we must have (y1, x2) ∈ B2, so that α2(x2) ≤ y1 < x1.
Hence (y1, x2), x ∈ B2(x2), implying (y1, x2) ∼ x. Since f2(x) = 0, we have x ∼ (x1, z2)
for any z2 > x2. By transitivity, (y1, x2) ∼ (x1, z2) which violates monotonicity, so
(a) must hold. If (b) does not hold, then ∃ z and z˜1 > z1 such that f2(z) = 1 and
f2(z˜1, z2) = 0. Taking x1 = z˜1, x2 = z2 and y1 = z1 contradicts (a). Hence (b) must
hold.
(II) If x1 ∈ A1, then ∃ α1(x1) = x2 such that f2(x1, y2) = 0 ∀ y2 ≥ x2. By Lemma
2(I), for any y1 ∈ [0, x1), we have f2(y1, x2) = 0. By definition of α1(.), we have
α1(y1) ≤ x2 = α1(x1) for all y1 ∈ [0, x1).
Since Ai = Xi (by Axiom 4), αi(.) is defined for any xi ∈ Xi. Lemma 3 derives
properties of this function and as a consequence we get the function F (.) specified in
the definition of GL preference.
Lemma 3 Suppose the preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 3 and Axiom 4.
The following hold for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
(I) αi(xi) > 0 for any xi > 0.
(II) αi(0) = 0.
(III) αj(αi(xi)) = xi.
(IV) αi(xi) is increasing for all xi ≥ 0.
(V) αi(xi) is an surjective function from Xi to Xj, i.e., for every xj ∈ Xj, ∃ xi ∈ Xi
such that αi(xi) = xj.
Proof: W.l.o.g., take i = 1, j = 2.
(I) Suppose on the contrary α1(x1) = 0 for some x1 > 0. Then by Lemma 2(II),
α1(y1) = 0 for all y1 ∈ [0, x1]. Then by Lemma 1(I), Axiom 1 holds, contradicting
Axiom 3.
(II) Suppose on the contrary α1(0) = x2 > 0. Let y2 ∈ (0, x2). Then (0, y2) /∈ B1
(since y2 < α1(0)) and (0, y2) /∈ B2 (since 0 < α2(y2), part (I)), i.e., y2 /∈ B1 ∪ B2,
which contradicts Axiom 4.
(III) By (II), the result clearly hold for x1 = 0, so let x1 > 0. Then α1(x1) > 0 (by
(I)). Let x2 < α1(x1). Then x /∈ B1, so by Axiom 4 we must have x ∈ B2, implying
that α2(x2) ≤ x1 for all x2 < α1(x1).
Now we show α2(α1(x1)) ≤ x1. Denote x2 = α1(x1). Suppose on the contrary
α2(x2) = y1 > x1 and let y2 = x2. Then y  x. For any neighborhoods Ny, Nx around
y, x we can find z ∈ Ny, z˜ ∈ Nx such that z2 = z˜2 < x2 = α1(x1) and z1 > z˜1 ≥ x1.
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Since x1 ≥ α2(z2), we have z, z˜ ∈ B2(z2), so that z ∼ z˜. This contradicts continuity of
% (see Definition C1, page 16, Rubinstein (2006)), proving that α2(α1(x1)) ≤ x1.
Denote α1(x1) = y2 and α2(y2) = y1. If y1 < x1, then y, (x1, y2) ∈ B2(y2), so
that y ∼ (x1, y2). Let z2 > y2 = α1(x1). Then (x1, z2), (x1, y2) ∈ B1(x1), implying
(x1, z2) ∼ (x1, y2). By transitivity, y ∼ (x1, z2), a contradiction (since x1 > y1 and
z2 > y2). Hence we must have y1 ≥ x1, i.e., α2(α1(x1)) ≥ x1. From the conclusion of
the previous paragraph, we conclude that α2(α1(x1)) = x1.
(IV) Since α1(0) = 0 and α1(x1) > 0 for any x1 > 0, α1(x1) is increasing at
x1 = 0. By Lemma 2(II), α1(x1) is non-decreasing. If it is not increasing for all x1 > 0,
∃ x1 > y1 > 0 such that α1(x1) = α1(y1) = x2 > 0. By part (III), we then have
α2(x2) = α2(α1(x1)) = x1 and α2(x2) = α2(α1(y1)) = y1 < x1, a contradiction.
(V) By (II), the result holds for x2 = 0. Suppose ∃ x2 > 0 such that α1(x1) 6= x2
∀ x1 ∈ X1. Since α1(.) is continuous and α1(0) = 0, we must have α1(x1) < x2 for all
x1 ∈ X1. By Axiom 4, A2 = X2. Hence x2 ∈ A2 and α2(x2) is well defined. Taking
x1 = α2(x2) above, we have α1(α2(x2)) < x2, which contradicts (III).
Proof of Theorem 2: (L1) ⇒ (L2) By Axiom 4, for i = 1, 2, Ai = Xi and αi(xi) is
well defined for all xi ∈ Xi. Note from Lemma 3 that α1(.) : X1 → X2 is an increasing
and surjective function with α1(0) = 0 (the same property holds for α2(.) : X2 → X1
and α2(.) is the inverse function of α1(.)). Taking F (x1) = α1(x1), by Lemma 3(III) it
follows that (i)-(iii) of Definition 4 hold.
(L2) ⇒ (L1) Suppose the preference is generalized Leontief. Then for i = 1, 2,
Ai = Xi = R+. For any x1 ∈ X1, we have α1(x1) = F (x1) and for any x2 ∈ A2, we
have α2(x2) = F
−1(x2), and F (0) = 0. Hence B1(x1) = {(x1, x2)|x2 ≥ F (x1)} and
B2(x2) = {(x1, x2)|x1 ≥ F−1(x2)}. So we have Bi = ∪xi∈XiBi(xi) for i = 1, 2, and
B1 ∪B2 = X. Therefore, Axiom 4 holds.
It remains to show that Axiom 3 holds. If for some i = 1, 2, ∃ S ⊆ Bi such that S
is an unhappy set of positive area, then ∃ x ∈ S such that xi > 0. By Lemma 1(II)(i),
this will imply that αi(xi) = 0 for all yi ∈ [0, xi], a contradiction since αi(yi) > 0 for
all yi > 0.
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